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ABSTRACT
The strategy analysis of taxpayer behavior while observing tax law requires weak-
ening of traditional initial assumptions in order to take into account the subjective 
character of economic agents’ reaction to tax system changes. The aim of the given 
research is to identify the appropriate model of taxpayers’ behavior in conditions of 
the tax control procedures transformation. The research methodology is based on 
the synthesis of the neo-classical concept of individual’s rational choice, and on the 
assumptions of behavioral economics, which allowed considering the problem of tax 
evasion as the situation of social interaction among economic agents in decentralized 
system by taking into account their individual interests. The results of modeling dem-
onstrated that tightening tax surveillance procedures undermines the coordination of 
interaction among autonomous tax groups. It leads to the growth of the possibility 
to select deviant behavior models. In this case the growth of tax management system 
efficiency expresses in budget income maximization, and is possible only by means 
of the extensive development of tax control procedures. The optimal strategy of the 
government behavior is using multimodal approach based on the partial replace-
ment of control function for the cooperative strategy of tax subjects’ interaction to 
reduce the natural taxpayer opportunism rate. And as an exceptional measure the 
harsh sanctions aimed to resist the deviant models of behavior are used. In this case 
the optimal choice for a taxpayer will depend additionally on the changes of social 
norms and stereotypes of behavior that characterize the quality of the institutional 
environment changes
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Behavioral economy, tax compliance, tax evasion, tax policy
HIGHLIGHTS
1. Creation of the tax law observance models is necessary to recognize the existence 
of differentiated reaction to the actions of the state regarding the implementation of 
control functions. It demands weakening of the main assumptions of a rather rational 
behavior of economic agents
2. Prevalence of the rigid control function in the system of tax administration leads to 
the fact that this hierarchical system, which possesses the criterion function connected 
with maximizing the controllability of the system will never be able to increase the 
efficiency due to transition to a condition of decentralization
3. Change of tax control forms is possible based on introducing the procedures of 
“horizontal monitoring” of “a fair play of initiatives”. It increases loyalty and trust by 
introducing the strategy of cooperation between taxpayers and the bodies of control
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Анализ стратегий поведения налогоплательщиков в части соблюдения нало-
говой законодательства требует ослабления исходных классических допуще-
ний, чтобы учесть субъективный характер реакции экономических агентов 
на изменение налоговой системы. Целью исследования является определение 
оптимальной модели поведения налогоплательщиков в условиях трансфор-
мации процедур налогового контроля. Методология исследования основана 
на синтезе неоклассической концепции рационального выбора индивида и 
предпосылках поведенческой экономики, что позволило рассмотреть пробле-
му уклонения от уплаты налогов как ситуацию социального взаимодействия 
экономических агентов в децентрализованной системе с учетом их индивиду-
альных интересов. Результаты моделирования показали, что ужесточение про-
цедур налогового контроля отрицательно влияет на координацию взаимодей-
ствия автономных групп налогоплательщиков и приводит к росту вероятности 
выбора ими девиантных моделей поведения. В этом случае рост эффективно-
сти системы налогового администрирования, выраженный в максимизации 
доходов бюджета, возможен только за счет экстенсивного развития процедур 
налогового контроля. Оптимальной стратегией поведения государства являет-
ся использование комбинированного подхода, который основан на частичной 
замене контрольной функции на кооперативную стратегию взаимодействия 
субъектов налоговой сферы для снижения естественного уровня оппортунизма 
налогоплательщиков, а в качестве исключительной меры используются жест-
кие санкции с целью противодействия девиантным моделям поведения. Тогда 
оптимальный выбор налогоплательщика будет дополнительно зависеть от из-
менения социальных норм и стереотипов поведения, которые характеризуют 
качество изменения институциональной среды
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Поведенческая экономика, соблюдение налогового законодательства, уклоне-
ние от уплаты налогов, налоговая политика
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. Построение моделей соблюдения налогового законодательства c учетом диф-
ференцированной реакции налогоплательщиков на действия государства в 
части реализации контрольных функций требует ослабления исходных клас-
сических допущений относительно рационального поведения экономических 
агентов
2. Доминирование в системе налогового администрирования контрольной 
функции приводит к тому, что данная иерархическая система, обладая целевой 
функцией, связанной с максимизацией контролируемости, не имеет возмож-
ности повышения своей эффективности за счет перехода в состояние децен-
трализации
3. Оптимизация форм налогового контроля возможна на основе внедрения про-
цедур «горизонтального мониторинга» «фэйр-плей инициатив», повышения 
лояльности и доверия за счет внедрения стратегий сотрудничества налогопла-
тельщиков и контрольных органов
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Introduction
The interest in studying the problem 
of tax evasion is connected with emer-
gence of the first systematic theoretical 
analysis carried out by Allingham and 
Sandmo [1]. The main questions which 
were studied in detail further concern the 
problems of tax evasion extent measure-
ment, explanation of taxpayers’ behavior, 
identification of the factors influencing the 
choice of economic agents as it is possible 
to use the received conclusions and results 
in practice.
Despite great success in this direc-
tion, there are considerable gaps in un-
derstanding, explaining and controlling 
illegal taxpayers’ behavior.
In the last decade there were works 
devoted to the use of experimental meth-
ods and theoretical prerequisites of behav-
ioral economy to explain these separate 
phenomena. On one hand, it allows solv-
ing a problem of the lack of reliable infor-
mation on observance by the taxpayer in 
legislation. Another interpretation of the 
received results demands the integration 
of “direct”, “indirect” and “model” ap-
proaches and development of universal 
methods and models of taxpayers’ behav-
ior assessment, as well as the assessment 
of the tax administration operating system 
efficiency.
The problems of economic agents’ 
behavior modeling in the sphere  
of tax relations
Originally the key issues of tax law 
observance were resolved within the 
frames of the neoclassical concept. It gen-
erally analyzed influences of the taxation 
and control parameters on a ratio of the 
declared and not declared (shadow) in-
come. For example, possible strategies of 
the state behavior in the course of control 
activity implementation are analyzed by 
Kronshou and Alma [2]. In the received 
model the taxpayer does not possess full 
information on possible checks, and the 
state does not possess all information on 
the size of the hidden income. The re-
ceived results demonstrate that the un-
certainty of audit can lead to decrease in 
tax revenues and such type of behavior is 
counterproductive.
In general, the existing models allow 
considering the various aspects of a prob-
lem of tax evasion and improving tax dis-
cipline. For example, the analysis of the 
types of taxpayers’ behavior (aggressive 
tax planning [3]), the ways of calculation 
and payment of taxes (the efficiency of 
the advanced system of tax payment [4]), 
expediency of tax control toughening 
mechanisms [5], the influence of central-
ization of the budgetary system level [6] 
is carried out.
There are two restrictive circumstanc-
es connected with theoretical and practical 
aspects of taxpayers’ behavior modeling. 
First, the basic assumptions and prerequi-
sites based on provisions of neoclassical 
school are too rigid, significantly simpli-
fying real interaction of economic agents 
in the tax sphere. Secondly, inclusion of 
nonlinear communications considerably 
complicates the search of solutions of ana-
lytical models of tax evasion. 
The main assumptions of rather ra-
tional behavior of economic agents which 
are also used in the analysis of taxpayers’ 
behavior is the following:
1. It is supposed that the taxpayer 
acts as “homo economicus”, i.e. has exclu-
sively economic motivation, and its choice 
is described by maximizing function of 
usefulness which is presented in the form 
of net income. One of the early studies 
criticizing this prerequisite is the of work 
Alma and Torglera [7]. They come to the 
conclusions that the existing inaccuracy 
of behavior models of taxpayers relates to 
the fact that they do not behave as rational 
or selfish individuals. In decision-making 
process considerable impact is exerted by 
various aspects of “tax ethics” therefore 
the neoclassical paradigm cannot explain 
process of the choice of behavior model.
2. Evasion from the taxation in the 
form of removal of a part of the income to 
the shadow sphere is followed by certain 
expenses — transactional costs of evasion, 
which, as a rule, are not considered within 
neoclassical models. 
3. In traditional neoclassical models 
of evasion the taxpayer necessarily acts 
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in the conditions of absolute knowledge 
of parameters and conditions of taxation, 
evasion and control. This assumption that 
the taxpayer acts in the localized social 
network is too strong. As shown in the 
work [8] it is also necessary to consider 
the factor of socially oriented taxpayers’ 
behavior.
4. It is implicit that all taxpayers are 
the hidden opportunists — carriers of the 
opportunistic motivation, who are with-
held from concealment of income only by 
the economic unprofitability of tax eva-
sion, and, in case of its efficiency, all tax-
payers will transfer their whole income to 
the shadow sector. Therefore, taxpayers 
are considered to be potential criminals, 
which allows estimating the efficiency of a 
traditional paradigm of tax administration 
only, and does not give the chance to con-
sider customer-oriented approaches [9].
Many researchers note that it is im-
possible to ignore the influence of institu-
tional bases and standards of behavior in 
the analysis of tax law problems. Davies, 
Hekht and Perkins note that the existing 
social norms of behavior accepted in cer-
tain circles exert considerable impact on 
taxpayers’ behavior. However, toughen-
ing of law-enforcement policy in case of 
considerable differentiation of society can 
lead to sharp violation of an equilibrium 
state, and the achievement of new bal-
ance will be followed by considerable ad-
ditional costs [10]. De Juan and Lasheras 
confirm, using the example of the Spanish 
taxpayers, that they render a set of demo-
graphic, psychological and social factors 
(besides the probability of tax evasion fact 
detection and the sizes of penalties for 
decision-making), which can have crucial 
importance in general [11]. Frey and Tor-
gler’s research allows answering the ques-
tion why so many people are ready to pay 
taxes, even in case when the probability 
of check and the sizes of tax penalties are 
small. The results of modeling carried out 
with the data of the poll in 30 countries of 
Eastern and Western Europe show the ex-
istence of high dependence between ten-
dency to tax evasion and the tax morality, 
as well as the quality of the institutional 
environment [12].
Several researches prove that the total 
choice of taxpayers is influenced by such 
factors as religion [13], existence of sense 
of guilt and shame [14], quality of demo-
cratic institutes [15], change of tax ethics 
[16], and existence of the sense of patrio-
tism [17]. 
Thus, creating the models of tax law 
observance, it is necessary to recognize 
that there are diverse types of tax behav-
ior which differ in the differentiated reac-
tion to the actions of the state regarding 
the control function implementation. It 
demands weakening of initial classical 
assumptions that the taxpayer’s behavior 
became more various and adaptive.
The substantial assumptions of the 
model are:
1. The taxpayer has the exogenous in-
come which it distributes on declared and 
shadow speaks rapidly by the rules de-
pending on type of his behavior.
2. The declared and shadow income 
is assessed: the first — at the tax rate, the 
second is assessed at the rates of a tax and 
a penalty at evasion detection.
3. Concealment of the income is ac-
companied by emergence of additional 
transactional costs which are set in the 
form of constant standard coefficient to 
the shadow income.
4. The shadow income can be found 
as a result of check which happens to a 
certain probability, and at detection can 
be revealed in whole or in part. Thus, ef-
ficiency of control in model is considered 
by means of an extensive factor — the 
frequency of checks, and an intensive fac-
tor — effectiveness of check (a share of the 
found shadow income). Both factors are 
set as random variables.
5. Restrictions for the maximum and 
minimum shares of the shadow income 
which reflect degree of aggression of tax-
payer behavior are introduced.
As a result we can consider tax eva-
sion as necessary action of the taxpayer 
which can be is caused by exogenous 
shocks result of what there will be a trans-
formation of system of tax administration 
regarding increase in its efficiency, first of 
all due to introducing the new softer tax 
control forms.
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The task of the maximum share of the 
shadow sector allows considering the lev-
el of law-abiding of taxpayers and scales 
of distribution of the hidden opportun-
ism. Respectively, the less its value, the 
lower is the potential level of tax evasion, 
irrespective of economic efficiency of this 
kind of behavior. The minimum share of 
the hidden income characterizes tendency 
of taxpayers to opportunism and shows 
its “natural” level. It should be noted 
that this indicator indirectly characterizes 
quality of the institutional environment 
[12]. Also, it is necessary to consider a pos-
sibility of use of procedures of horizontal 
control as for decrease in “natural” level 
of opportunism, and its growth above av-
erage value.
Level of “natural” opportunism de-
pends on various factors where an im-
portant role is played by the taxpayers’ 
of justice assessment of tax system and 
its equivalence in terms of the public ben-
efits provided by the state. Setting the 
minimum share of the hidden income, it is 
necessary to consider the fact that in soci-
ety there is always a hidden opportunism 
which under certain conditions, provid-
ing its economic efficiency, can actively 
develop, and the opportunistic behavior 
becomes public standard and a stereotype 
of behavior.
The Model of the taxpayer optimum 
strategy choice  
in the decentralized system
Complexity of interaction of taxpay-
ers with supervisory authorities is that 
the state has to constantly put certain 
pressure (implementation of control pro-
cedures) and at the same time is under 
reciprocal pressure (decrease in tax rev-
enues due to use by taxpayers of deviant 
behavior models).
It is obvious that all set of taxpayers is 
the decentralized system. These systems 
are characterized by the fact that there is 
no uniform center of decision-making, so, 
decisions are made by each autonomous 
education separately (the natural or legal 
entity). It means that modeling of the de-
centralized systems, as a matter of fact, 
comes down to modeling of its separate 
elements. Aggregation of behavior of sep-
arate elements of system will also make 
the general model of functioning of the 
decentralized system.
Considering that taxpayers’ pressure 
described above is collective action, in 
such system there is a problem connected 
this collective action happened presence 
of the taxpayers ready to tax evasion is 
necessary. In turn from outside the state 
is possible toughening of control proce-
dures or introducing the new tax control 
forms based on cooperation. Anyway, a 
part of individuals decides to carry out 
collective action of Z, and the system in 
reply will increase the efficiency of Es. At 
the same time the new condition of sys-
tem and its level of efficiency is offered 
to all taxpayers, regardless of that, they 
evaded paying taxes or not. The formula 
is as follows:
→( ) max,SE Z
=
= ∑ 1 ,n iiZ z
<<max{ } .iz Z
The state seeks to maximize the 
operating system of tax administration. For 
this purpose it has to provide appropriate 
level of control, and each taxpayer makes 
the decision on a possibility of tax evasion. 
At the same time individual pressure 
is much less than necessary collective 
pressure. The described situation has the 
appearance represented in the following 
payment matrix (Table 1).
Table 1
Payment matrix of taxpayers’ pressure 
upon the state
Index Z Z*
Pressure − −′( ) ( )s s ih E h E z  –zi
Not pressure  −′( ) ( )s sh E h E 0
Where ′( )sh E  — benefit of the individ-
ual from the new level of system effective-
ness; (Es) — benefit of the individual from 
the old level of system effectiveness.
The game shown above is a game with 
the nature in which the nature has two 
states: achievement of the set level of col-
lective pressure (Z) and not achievement 
of this level (Z*). At achievement of the 
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set pressure level individuals can receive 
new benefits from system effectiveness ex-
pressed, for example, in granting tax ben-
efits and decrease in a tax burden or intro-
ducing the new procedures of tax control 
(“horizontal monitoring” [18]).
The player’s prize at strategy applica-
tion “Pressure” and achievement of the 
set level of collective pressure is a differ-
ence between a benefit gain from change 
of system effectiveness 
−′( ) ( )s sh E h E  and 
selling costs of the individual pressure (zi).
In case the taxpayer chose the strat-
egy of “no-pressure” and at the same time 
the volume of under gathered taxes in the 
budgetary system reached critical level, 
then the individual receives the same gain 
of benefit from efficiency change, however 
at the same time it did not incur any costs.
If the individual chose strategy “Pres-
sure”, but at the same time the total vol-
ume of under gathered taxes in the bud-
getary system did not exceed critical level, 
then it, without getting anything, incurs 
transactional costs in connection with the 
choice of illegal behavior model, as well as 
potential penalties.
In case the individual chose the strat-
egy of “no-pressure” and at the same time 
the set level of collective pressure was not 
reached, it gets nothing and loses nothing.
It is obvious that the strategy of “no-
pressure” is the dominating strategy. It is 
favorable to taxpayer to remain law-abid-
ing, at the same time he has the right to 
expect with a certain probability that there 
can occur weakening of fiscal or adminis-
trative pressure when he receives benefit, 
without having incurred any costs. Simi-
lar strategy in literature carries the name 
of a problem of the free rider [19].
To get rid of this effect, it is necessary 
to transform the public benefit to other 
type of the benefits, for example, in the 
club benefit [20]. The club benefit bears in 
itself restriction for use of it only of those 
people who made the individual action. 
At the same time the property of the club 
benefits connected with lack of the com-
petition in consumption remains same, as 
well as at the public benefits. It is possible 
to carry additional 20 % to examples of the 
club benefits tax discounts which receive 
the organizations which are members of 
self-regulating cooperatives in France.
Having destroyed a possibility of re-
ceiving the benefit without commission of 
individual actions, we transform the ini-
tial situation described in Table 1 to a clas-
sical problem of game theory.
The individual is offered to participate 
in a game. The cost of a game is equal to zi. 
With probability of p(Z) the individual can 
receive a prize C.
The individual possessing the neutral 
attitude towards risk will meet the follow-
ing condition:
= − − +′
+ − − >
( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
(1 ( ))( ) 0,
s s i
i
M p Z h E h E z
p Z z       
(1)
where M — population mean of a game, 
p(Z) — probability that Z will be reached.
Having expressed from (1) probability 
that collective action will make Z, we re-
ceive the following expression:
>
−′
( ) .
( ) ( )
i
s s
zp Z
h E h E  
(2)
Expression (2) is a necessary condi-
tion of participation of the taxpayer in 
collective action Z rather club benefits of 
Es. From it is visible that the pressure level 
demanded from the individual is higher, 
the achievement of Z has to have a high 
probability. At the same time, on the con-
trary, the benefits from a new condition 
of system effectiveness are higher; the 
achievement of Z can have smaller prob-
ability in order that the taxpayer made the 
decision on realization of the individual 
pressure.
If specified in (2) ratio it is not carried 
out, but at the same time size 
−′( ) ( )s sh E h E  
is rather big, then the taxpayer can con-
sider the possibility to participate in other 
game. A game is in reaching a desirable 
condition of system effectiveness only 
through the individual action, for ex-
ample, through bribery to the staff of tax 
authorities. At the same time increase in 
system effectiveness will happen only for 
it. That is in this case the benefit becomes 
individual.
Besides the individual possessing the 
neutral attitude towards risk will make 
the following assessment of population 
mean:
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= − − +′
+ − − − >
( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
(1 ( ))( ) 0,
s sM p b h E h E b
p Z b c       
(3)
where b — bribe size; p(b) — probability to 
be not caught for bribery; с — punishment 
for bribery.
Having expressed from (3) probability 
to be not caught for bribery, we receive the 
following expression:
+
>
− −′
( ) .
( ) ( )s s
b cp Z
h E h E c  
(4)
At with, striving for infinity, and b 
smaller what 
−′( ) ( )s sh E h E , it turns out 
that the probability of p(b) aspires to unit. 
That is for participation in this game “se-
verity of laws has to be compensated by a 
non-obligation of their execution”.
If for the taxpayer, conditions (2) and 
(4) are not carried out, then he refuses any 
attempts to increase system effectiveness 
with which interacts.
Distinctive feature of such projects 
is that the probability of successful fund 
raising, signatures, etc. is the dynamic 
size depending on the current level of the 
raised funds.
In relation to the situation with collec-
tive action described above the probability 
of achievement of the set level of pressure 
will have the following appearance:
p(nz* > Z) = S(Z), 
where n — the number of the taxpayers 
who made at the moment individual ac-
tion; z* — the average amount of unpaid 
taxes; S(Z) — value of function of survival 
of collective action to level Z.
The solution to the problem  
of contradiction between taxpayers’ 
individual actions and the efficiency  
of the decentralized system
The problem described above con-
cerns only the creation of the pressure 
mechanism to increase the efficiency of tax 
control procedures, however it also exists 
in the analysis of negative impact of illegal 
taxpayers’ behavior in open systems tak-
ing into account tax morals. The matter is 
rather well opened in work [8]. Actually, 
taxpayers possess ambivalent characteris-
tics, such as ideas of probability of check 
and detention, as well as about the choice 
of strategy of behavior by “the next tax-
payers”. In this case the level of tax law 
observance grows, in comparison with a 
situation when the strategies of neighbors’ 
payments are unknown to the taxpayer.
Thus, the model of the choice of strat-
egy of taxpayer behavior is also described 
by expression (2). And tendency to tax law 
observance will be higher in case of exis-
tence of the club benefit.
However, It should be noted that, 
inclusion of a possibility of holding new 
procedures of tax control such as “hori-
zontal monitoring” and “initiative fair 
play”, (“horizontal monitoring”, “fair-
play initiatives”) in the conditions of the 
high level of tax morals leads to growth 
of transactional costs [18]. The following 
expenses concern to them:
– costs of internal audit for the pur-
pose of restriction of access for unfair tax-
payers for the accession to self-regulatory 
organizations, otherwise, it is costs of fight 
against Cf;
– costs of coordination of taxpayers 
(CZ), they have to agree about a target 
indicator (Z) and about the level of indi-
vidual influence (zi).
It means that expression (2) will take 
the following form:
= − − − − +′
+ − − − − >
( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
(1 ( ))( ) 0,
s s i fi zi
i fi zi
M p Z h E h E z C C
p Z z C C
where Cf — costs of fight against “free rid-
ers” counting on 1 individual; Czi — costs 
of coordination counting on 1 individual.
If from (5) to express probability of 
achievement of Z again, then the follow-
ing expression will turn out:
+ +
>
−′
( ) .
( ) ( )
i fi zi
s s
z C C
p Z
h E h E  
(6)
From (6) it is visible that increased 
requirements are imposed to probability 
of achievement of Z and to a benefit gain 
from a new condition of efficiency now. 
As a result of it many participants will 
count, it does not make sense that to par-
ticipate in this game. If transactional costs 
have considerable level, then it can lead to 
the fact that the decentralized system will 
not be able effectively to create and con-
sume both the public, and club benefits.
(5)
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Having expressed from (6) size of 
transactional costs, we will receive the re-
striction for their sum necessary for par-
ticipation of the individual in collective 
action:
− < − −′( )[ ( ) ( )] .fi zi s s iC C p Z h E h E z
Transaction costs counting on 1 tax-
payer have to be less, than the work of 
probability of achievement of Z and gain 
of benefit from growth of system effective-
ness minus the size of individual pressure.
At outflow of individuals from the 
decentralized system in it the costs con-
nected with coordination decrease. How-
ever, at the same time also the probabil-
ity of achievement of Z as the potential 
number of participants decreases, so, the 
individual contribution of the individual 
of zi raises. Therefore, the decentralized 
system will have the right for life only if:
= −′
( )
[ ( ) ( )],zi s s
d d
dp ZdC h E h E
dN dN       
(7)
where Nd — the number of individuals in 
the decentralized system.
If the condition (7) is not satisfied, 
then in the considered environment there 
is only one system which is hierarchical. If 
the condition is satisfied, then the overflow 
of individuals in hierarchical system comes 
from the decentralized system until, opti-
mum Nd value at which, on the one hand, 
there are rather low transaction costs will 
not be reached yet, on the other hand, there 
is enough people for achievement of the set 
level Z. In other words, such Nd at which 
in a condition (7) there is an equality of the 
left and right part is necessary.
Proceeding from the aforesaid, it is 
possible to draw a conclusion that an en-
vironment O can be described in the form 
of couple of values {α; 1 – α}where α there 
is a share of the taxpayers using the decen-
tralized system, and 1– α there is a share 
of the taxpayers using hierarchical system.
Provided that the hierarchical system 
is such a system, where the top level has 
the criterion of the function directed to 
maximizing efficiency, a couple of values 
{α; 1 – α} will be optimum. If the hierarchi-
cal system is a system, where top levels of 
hierarchy have the criterion of the func-
tion connected with maximizing control-
lability of system, then the couple of val-
ues {α; 1 – α} can differ from optimum. It 
is the fact that top levels of hierarchy to 
increase the control will seek to limit an 
overflow from hierarchical system in the 
decentralized system, as it will reduce 
their level of control.
From this a conclusion follows that a 
prevalence in system of tax administration 
of rigid control function and ignoring of 
such factors as trust to the operating tax 
system, existence of tax morals leads to 
the fact that this hierarchical system, pos-
sessing the criterion function connected 
with maximizing controllability of system 
will never be able to increase the efficiency 
due to transition to a condition of decen-
tralization.
Conclusions
In the long term the increase in the 
systematic effectiveness of tax administra-
tion is possible due to the growth of entro-
py of the tax system top levels, reduction 
of uncertainty in the tax sphere, lifting of 
restrictions forming an imbalance of rela-
tionship between the state and taxpayers.
The first two options demand consid-
erable investments. Increase in entropy of 
top levels of hierarchy requires the creation 
of additional divisions in tax authorities, 
increase in number of qualified personnel 
in the sphere of tax conflicts solution. Re-
duction of uncertainty demands introduces 
the new informational and analytical sys-
tems of decision-making support.
The third option is potentially the 
least expensive. The change of the right 
part of the restriction in the smaller party, 
under the law of hierarchical compensa-
tions by Sedov [21], will mean that the 
top level of hierarchy weakens functions 
of control and management and under-
takes functions on coordination of the 
self-organized organizations created as a 
result of growth of entropy various auton-
omous. The change of tax control forms, 
introducing the procedures of “horizontal 
monitoring” of “a fair play of initiatives”, 
increases loyalty and trust due to intro-
ducing the strategy of cooperation of tax-
payers and bodies of control, and can be 
the purpose of such coordination.
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